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Mapping Hazard Zones, Rapid
Warning Communication
and Understanding Communities:
Primary Ways to Mitigate Pyroclastic
Flow Hazard
Franck Lavigne, Julie Morin, Estuning Tyas Wulan Mei,
Eliza S. Calder, Muhi Usamah and Ute Nugroho
Abstract
Protection against the consequences of Pyroclastic Density Currents (PDCs)
is almost impossible due to their high velocity, temperature, sediment load
and mobility. PDCs therefore present a challenge for volcanic crisis
management in that speciﬁc precautionary actions, essentially evacuations,
are required to reduce loss of life. In terms of crisis communication for PDC
hazards, there are three challenging questions that arise in terms of reducing
risk to life, infrastructure and livelihoods. (1) How do we accurately
communicate the hazardous zones related to potential PDC inundation?
The areas exposed to PDC hazard are difﬁcult to assess and to map. In terms
of risk/crisis management, the areas considered at risk are usually those that
were affected by PDCs during previous eruptive episodes (decades or
centuries ago). In case of “larger-than-normal” eruptions, the underestima-
tion of the hazard zone may lead to refusals to evacuate in the “newly”
threatened area. Another difﬁculty in assessing the PDC hazard zones relate
to their transport processes that allow surmounting of the topography and in
some cases across the surface of water. Therefore warning systems must be
able to cover vast areas in aminimumof time. (2)Howdowe efﬁciently warn
people in time? PDCs are extremelymobile and fast. It is therefore necessary
to raise the alert early enough before the onset of the ﬁrst PDCs.
A challenging question in terms of crisis communication is related to the
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type of tools used by the local authorities, modern and traditional tools both
of which have advantages and disadvantages. (3)Why are people reluctant
to evacuate? Local inhabitants can be reluctant to evacuate during a crisis
if traditional warning signs or signals they are familiar with are lacking, if
they don’t receive both traditional and ofﬁcial warning, and because they
may lose their livelihoods. Thus a deeper understanding of the at‐risk
communities and efﬁcient dissemination of information are key issues in
order to reduce vulnerability in PDC hazard regions.
Keywords
Pyroclastic density currents  Risk communication  Crisis management 
Warning  Evacuation  Risk perception
1 Introduction
Pyroclastic Density Currents (PDCs) are rapid
flowage phenomena that involve various pro-
portions of volcanic gas and fragmented volcanic
rock at high temperatures. PDCs encompass
dense pyroclastic flows, which tend to be more
topographically controlled, and dilute pyroclastic
surges that are less topographically controlled
and can surmount topographic obstacles, or tra-
vel across the surface of bodies of water. Both
dense flows and dilute surges destroy almost
everything in their path and therefore protection
against the consequences of PDC inundation is
almost impossible. In some countries, anti-PDC
bunkers have been built in high hazard prone
areas to provide a safe shelter to a limited num-
ber of people in the situation that they are unable
to evacuate on time. It was demonstrated in 2006
on Merapi (Indonesia) that they are not always
effective, as two people died trapped in the
bunkers where they took refuge (Gertisser et al.
2011). Moreover, hard engineering structures
such as SABO dams may actually accentuate the
avulsion process of PDCs, e.g. in 2006 and 2010
at Merapi (Lube et al. 2011), or Tungurahua in
2006 (Stone et al. 2014). Thus, PDCs present a
challenge for volcanic crisis management in that
speciﬁc precautionary actions are required to
reduce loss of life.
The improvement of crisis management
capabilities is based, on one hand, on PDC
monitoring and early warning systems as well as
robust communications that are not likely to be
compromised for example by power failure and,
on the other hand, on preparedness of stake-
holders and population (MIAVITA Team 2012).
This chapter discusses three challenging
questions in reducing the risk associated with
PDCs: (1) How should we accurately commu-
nicate the hazardous zone related to potential
PDC inundation? (2) How should we efﬁciently
warn people in time? (3) Why are people often-
times reluctant to evacuate and how should we
improve the propensity for people to accept and
undertake evacuations?
These points are addressed through examples,
mostly focusing on Merapi, and other Indonesian
volcanoes as well as other volcanoes around the
world. This chapter concludeswith a discussion on
ways to improve volcanic risk management in
areas prone to PDC hazards.
2 How Can We Communicate PDC
Hazard Zones?
The areas exposed to PDC hazard are difﬁcult to
accurately assess and to map. In terms of
risk/crisis management, the areas considered at
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risk are usually those that were affected by PDCs
during the last decades or centuries. Scientists in
charge of volcano monitoring often use a “ref-
erence eruption”, the extent of volcanic deposits
of which are used to gauge inundation extent for
future eruption scenarios in operational hazard
maps. For instance, the “danger zones” maps
used in Indonesia for emergency planning are
provided by the Center of Volcanology and
Geological Hazards Mitigation (CVGHM).
These maps typically display two zones threat-
ened by PDC hazard: the KRB III (KRB stands
for Kawasan Rawan Bencana in Indonesian or
Hazard Prone Area in English) encompasses
areas located close to the summit, frequently
affected by dome-collapsed pyroclastic flows,
lava flows, rock falls and ejected rock fragments.
The KRB II is affected by less frequent and
longer runout pyroclastic flows, lahars, volcanic
ash fall, and ejected rocks. At Merapi for
example, the boundaries of hazard zone III and II
were based, until 2010, on the distribution of
volcanic products of the largest eruptions of the
20th century. Therefore the maximum distance of
the KRB II did not exceed 15 km, which was the
approximate maximum extension of the 1930,
1961, and 1969 PDCs. Since its ﬁrst edition in
1978 (Pardyanto et al. 1978, Fig. 8.1), the vol-
canic hazards map has been widely disseminated
among the communities at risk through the local
authorities and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). Although this map was updated fol-
lowing the 2006 eruption (Mei and Lavigne
2012), the contingency plan created in 2009 still
did not consider a plinian or subplinian eruption
scenario such as the one that occurred in 1872.
Several areas affected by the subsequent and
devastating 2010 PDCs, the length of which were
substantially longer than expected (17 km from
the summit), had not been included in the danger
zone. As a result 53 people who were resisting
evacuation or who were late in the process of
evacuating were killed in Bronggang, a village
located 13.5 km to the south of Merapi, when
dilute surges detached from their parent flows in
the adjacent Gendol River and entered the village
(Jenkins et al. 2013). Among the survivors,
several inhabitants who were unprepared for
evacuation took a wrong evacuation route too
close to the river (Mei et al. 2013). Since the
2010 eruption, the hazard map has been revised
(Fig. 8.1).
Fig. 8.1 The Merapi volcano hazard map designed by the Indonesian Center of Volcanology and Geological Hazard
Mitigation (CVGHM) in 2002 (CVGHM 2002) and after its revision in 2011 (CVGHM 2011)
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Although the local authorities are often aware
of the worst-case scenario provided by the vol-
canologists, they cannot use it for contingency
planning, i.e. for risk management. Using the
worst case scenario for a background hazard map
is actually impractical since many existing com-
munities are established on deposits from large
eruptions, and an eruption is unlikely to reach
worst case without some precursory activity.
However, all possibilities should be discussed
between volcanologists and authorities well
before a crisis, so that outline contingency plan-
ning can be made if signiﬁcant escalation does
occur. Communities can live within hazard zones,
if they are aware of the threat and there is good
planning for evacuations in the event of an
escalation. Maps are commonly adjusted as a
crisis evolves, as shown in the cases of Merapi.
During the 2012 Tongariro eruption crisis in New
Zealand, Leonard et al. (2014) highlighted the
importance and complementary roles of three
map types for communicating volcanic hazard
information: background hazard, crisis hazard
and ashfall prediction maps. In developing haz-
ard maps there are a range of key points to con-
sider in terms of message, presentation and basis
for each map type. For example, perspective view
has been shown to increase map readability and
public self-location accuracy (Haynes et al.
2007b; Nave et al. 2010). Following Leonard
et al. (2014), PDC hazards need careful quantiﬁ-
cation through modelling. For rapid crisis PDC
hazard map zone development the critical factors
are (1) having access to and experience in running
flow models, (2) having those models tested
against the past and expected future parameters of
a volcano and (3) having access to the computing
resources needed to run enough scenarios in a
short (day to days) timeframe.
The main difﬁculty in communicating PDC
hazardous zones occurs when the hazard is
almost unknown, or has been forgotten by local
people over time after a few generations, such as
on the slopes of the Mount Pelée on the island of
Martinique before the 1902 eruption (Leone and
Lesales 2009). One day before the total
destruction of Saint-Pierre by pyroclastic surges,
a scientiﬁc expert from mainland France claimed
that “Saint-Pierre is not more threatened by the
Pelée volcano than Napoli by the Vesuvius vol-
cano”. This scientist was not aware that dilute
pyroclastic surges could occur at Mount Pelée
(such as during the plinian eruption in 1300 AD),
since these phenomena were not yet known
(Lacroix 1904). Examples as this one are
numerous in volcanic areas. For instance, most of
the villages of the northern and southeastern
coast of Lombok Island (Indonesia) have been
built on pumice PDC deposits emplaced during
the 1257 AD ultraplinian eruption of the Samalas
volcano (Lavigne et al. 2013).
3 How Do We Warn People in Time?
3.1 Difficulties in Providing Timely
Warnings
PDCs are extremely mobile, generally travelling
at tens to hundreds of km/h. Therefore alerts need
to be provided at least several hours before the
ﬁrst PDC occurs. Unfortunately, local popula-
tions are not always warned by the authorities
before an imminent eruption, for various reasons.
In case of gravitational collapses of silicic lava
domes, which trigger ‘Merapi-type’ pyroclastic
flows, warning people is not possible until the
occurrence of the collapse itself: reliable pre-
cursory signals have not yet been identiﬁed, as
observed on Merapi on 22 November 1994
(Abdurachman et al. 2000), although in some
cases, the characteristics of seismic activity can
change leading up to a collapse e.g. at Soufriere
Hills (Cole et al. 1998). In some cases, the
absence of warning may be related to traditional
scepticism in technological predictions, when
local ofﬁcials refuse to listen to the scientiﬁc
forecasts and predictions at the very beginning of
a volcanic crisis (IAVCEI Subcommittee for
Crisis Protocols 1999). Additional external
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drivers may prevent an alert by the local
authorities (the mayor in many cases), e.g. local
elections, as observed at the beginning of the
1902 eruption of Mount Pelée in Martinique
(Lacroix 1904).
3.2 Modern Versus Traditional
Warning Tools
The type of tools used to communicate warnings
by local authorities in times of crisis is critical to
ensuring an effective messaging. Modern tools
like sirens are increasingly used as “ofﬁcial”
warning systems on active volcanoes. In devel-
oping countries, however, the areal distribution
of sirens is not homogenous, e.g. around Merapi
in Indonesia (Fig. 8.2). Based on a survey carried
out among 1969 people in shelters during the
2010 eruption of Merapi, only 16% of the people
were warned by sirens before the PDCs totally
destroyed the slopes of the volcano (Fig. 8.3,
Mei et al. 2013), whereas most people received
evacuation alerts directly from the head of village
(54%), or from neighbors (11%).
The warning signal may be also transmitted
by a mobile system installed on the ﬁre depart-
ment’s vehicles (e.g. in France). In Japan, the
Fig. 8.2 Siren distribution around the flanks of Merapi, Indonesia. Source Lavigne et al. (2015), based on Mei et al.
(2013)
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J-Alert system, launched in 2007, aims to allow
government ofﬁcials to address the population
directly via loudspeakers, e.g. in case of an
eruption alert.
Other modern tools are widely used to warn
people of imminent PDCs. Should a volcanic
event happen, local people considered at risk
may receive a warning message in the form of
SMS Text Message and/or Email onto their cell
phones, smart phones or other electronic devices
like iPads, Laptops, Desktop computers, etc.
Usually, this type of warning message would be
distributed by Civil Defense Corps and includes
all the hazards that could trigger an emer-
gency situation, not only volcanic hazards, e.g.
the app provided in Auckland (www.
aucklandcivildefence.org.nz/Alerting/Get-the-
Applications) or in Hawaii (http://www.
hawaiicounty.gov/active-alerts). At Tongariro
Volcano in New Zealand, for example, an alert is
provided by the key scientiﬁc institution to
related agencies (e.g. Civil Defense and Emer-
gency Management) and the media through
online bulletins as well as direct communication
through its emergency network. This bulletin is
also accessible by the public via their network
website and social media (Leonard et al. 2014).
In Japan, real-time volcanic warning is available
to the public on the website (JMA 2015). Beyond
volcanic hazards, Japanese agencies send out
SMS alerts to all registered mobile phones in the
country (Pearson 2015).
Although modern tools are growing, tradi-
tional tools are still considered as efﬁcient
warning tools by local authorities, especially in
remote areas. For example, the Indonesian ken-
tongan (bamboo drum: Fig. 8.4a) is traditionally
used for warning the public, notably in rural
areas or during an emergency period during
which electricity might be cut off, meaning that
Fig. 8.3 The source of
warnings during the 2010
volcanic crisis of Merapi,
Indonesia (adapted from
Mei and Lavigne 2013)
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modern alert tools relying on electricity power
might be dysfunctional. Based on a ﬁeld survey
at Merapi in 2002, over 70% of interviewed
villagers thought that the kentongan was an
efﬁcient warning system (Lavigne et al. 2008).
Every kentongan code has its own meaning
(Fig. 8.4b). In case of volcanic disaster, the
kentongan is beaten repeatedly and continuously
with the same tone. It indicates that people
should immediately evacuate to a pre-determined
location, which is usually a village hall. How-
ever, many people among the young generation
are not able to interpret the signals anymore.
Therefore, the use of this tool is forbidden during
Merapi’s volcanic crisis in some municipalities
or villages, e.g. in Sawangan and Selo on the
north slope of the volcano (Mei et al. 2013).
3.3 Official Warning Versus
Community-Based Warning
Local communities are still using natural warning
signs of various types, as exempliﬁed on the
slopes of Merapi: increase in rock fall noise,
increase in fumarolic activity from the summit’s
crater, the descent of monkeys or other wild
animals from the hills, ground shaking relating
to increased seismic activity, or lightning storms
caused by the emission of ash into the atmo-
sphere. Local inhabitants can be reluc-
tant to evacuate during a crisis if signals they are
familiar with are lacking, and if they don’t
receive both traditional and ofﬁcial warning of a
possible eruption (Donovan 2010). Furthermore,
some culturally accepted warning signs can cre-
ate a false sense of security, and it can be a
struggle for some to believe those based on sci-
entiﬁc monitoring alone. Such problems related
to traditional cultural beliefs were reported not
only in developing countries, but also in the USA
at Mt. Kilauea in Hawaii (Gregg et al. 2004),
Mount St. Helens (Greene et al. 1981), and in
Italy at Mt. Etna and Mt. Vesuvius (Chester et al.
2008).
The credibility of a given warning and the
validity of past warnings and evacuations, both
influence the decision to evacuate. Social, eco-
nomic and political forces may distort risk mes-
sages, leading to public reliance upon informal
information networks (Haynes et al. 2008), e.g.
social networks. Therefore, local organizations
play a key role in crisis communication, as
exempliﬁed at Merapi by the actions of
JalinMerapi (Jaringan Informasi Lingkar Mer-
api, in English Merapi Circle Information Net-
work), a local organization supported by several
NGOs working around the volcano. This
Fig. 8.4 The use of bamboo drums (kentongan) at Merapi, Indonesia. a kentongan at the entrance of a house on the
West slope of Merapi (Photo F. Lavigne, 2010). b Kentongan communication codes. Source Lavigne et al. (2015)
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association was established in 2006 by three
community-based radio stations. During the
emergency response period in 2010, JalinMerapi
used various electronic media to quickly and
accurately convey important information and
data to support the decision making process.
JalinMerapi information was transmitted through
a website, social networks such as Twitter and
Facebook, SMS, radio communications, tele-
phone and through information posters in the
ﬁeld. JalinMerapi was managed by a voluntary
network that operated 24 h a day during the 2010
eruption (Mei et al. 2013). Thus, repetition of
warnings through different sources of the evac-
uation command-line increased the chances that
people heeded the warning.
Community-based volcano risk communica-
tion is also exempliﬁed by the existence of the
los vigias system in Tungurahua, Ecuador. Los
vigias literally means watchmen, and comprises
organised surveillance of the volcano made up of
local community members from different villages
situated on the flanks of the volcano. The vigias
system has been integrated into the ofﬁcial risk
communication of Tungurahua managed by the
Volcano Observatory of Tungurahua (Stone et al.
2014).
4 Why Are People Reluctant
to Evacuate?
Refusal to evacuate is one of the main issues in
volcanic crisismanagement, as exempliﬁed during
the 2010 eruption of Merapi (Fig. 8.5). Evacua-
tions have traditionally been a difﬁcult task to carry
out because of people’s reluctance to leave
their homes and land. Various reasons com-
pound people’s reluctance to evacuate in case of a
volcanic crisis related to PDC hazard, as exem-
pliﬁed at Merapi (Mei and Lavigne 2013).
First, the principal reason for hesitancy is that
some people do not believe that their lives are
endangered by PDCs, or that PDCs are likely in
that locality. Thus differences in perception of
PDC management issues by local communities
and scientists or emergency planners may lead to
a disruption of crisis management plans (John-
ston and Ronan 2000; Ronan 2013). PDC hazard
experience may create an inaccurate localized
template for future eruptions, giving local people
a false sense of safety (Douglas 1985; Donovan
2010). For instance, despite the efforts of ofﬁ-
cials, scientists and concerned members of the
public of Montserat, about 80 people were in
Zones A and B of the Exclusion Zone on 25
June 1997 (Loughlin et al. 2002). Many had
become accustomed to the pyroclastic flows and
had become overconﬁdent in their own ability to
judge the threat by observing repeated flows that
had gradually increased runout but remained
restricted to valleys. Many people had contin-
gency plans and believed that there would be
observable or audible warning signs from the
volcano if the activity were to escalate signiﬁ-
cantly (Loughlin et al. 2002). The feeling of
safety is enhanced with the presence of concrete
structures like Sabo dams, and by increasing
distance of the village from the crater. The
feeling of safety felt by the local communities
living further than 15 km from Merapi crater in
2010 was enhanced by the extent of the pyro-
clastic flow hazardous areas delineated by
CVGHM, which did not take into account the
possibility of a major explosive eruption (Mei
et al. 2013). Therefore understanding how peo-
ple perceive risk has become increasingly
important for improving risk communication and
reducing risk associated conflicts (Haynes et al.
2008).
Second, it is essential to consider the local and
cultural factors in volcanic risk and crisis man-
agement (Lavigne et al. 2008). During the 2010
PDC of Merapi, the evacuation refusal of Mbah
Marijan (the volcano’s gatekeeper or Juru Kunci)
and his followers led to the deaths of thirty-ﬁve
people in Kinarhejo, a village located only 5 km
from the summit, including the gatekeeper him-
self. Before this disaster, evacuation refusals
along the southern flank of the volcano were
mostly conditioned by trust in the gatekeeper and
the feeling of being protected by his presence
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(Mei and Lavigne 2012), even though in 2010
Marijan suggested to people not to follow his
decision to stay in the village. Another
well-known disaster related to large PDCs was
partly due to evacuation refusals for cultural
reasons: the 1963 eruption of Mount Agung
occurred at the time of a very rare and important
Balinese ceremony at Besaki Hindu temple,
7 km away from the crater. The PDCs were
therefore interpreted as a punishment from the
gods, leading to the death of more than 1000
people. Careful communication and awareness
of potential culture clashes might aid
communication within and beyond the scientiﬁc
community (Donovan and Oppenheimer 2014).
Third, people may be reluctant to evacuate
even if they are aware of the danger. Economic
pressure may explain people’s behaviour during
crisis, since they often refuse to evacuate in order
to cultivate their crops, take care of their animals
and protect their goods. Evacuation can have
severe consequences on the economy of a village
or a city. During the 2007 volcanic crisis of Kelut
volcano in East Java, for instance, 77% of people
living in Sugihwaras, a village close to the crater
did not pay attention to the warning message
Fig. 8.5 Evacuation refusal during the 2010 eruption of
Merapi volcano, Indonesia. Refusal means that at least
one person in the village has been identiﬁed by the
village’s chief as being reluctant to evacuate after have
received the warning. Source Lavigne et al. (2015)
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issued by the government, and almost a half of
the interviewees disregarded the order to evacu-
ate (De Belizal et al. 2012). They chose to stay at
home, hiding themselves in their own houses,
closing shutters and turning off lights. Almost
two third of those interviewed thought it was
dangerous to leave their houses and assets
behind. They declared that they were afraid of
potential looters, a common perception which
has been deeply discussed in the literature (e.g.
by Quarantelli 1984).
Some people refuse to evacuate until other
family members, and also pets, are safe. A study
conducted within the community living around
Mayon Volcano, the Philippines, reveals how
community members were not willing to stay at
evacuation centers and preferred to stay with
family members should an evacuation warning
be issued by the authorities (Usamah and Haynes
2012). People may be reluctant to evacuate due
to the sanitary situation in evacuation centres,
either actual or due to rumors spread by the
media. For instance, some people from Sugih-
waras (Kelut) did not evacuate to the shelters
during the 2008 volcanic crisis, because they
heard that they were insalubrious (De Belizal
et al. 2012). The media asserted that infectious
diseases were spreading in many camps because
of the bad quality of the food. The newspaper
condemned the organizations in charge of the
evacuation centres. Rumours of such diseases
spread quickly and many people believed that
problems occurred in every evacuation center.
Such rumors have been largely covered by the
literature (e.g. Drabek 1999) and may increase
people’s vulnerability.
5 Building Trust in Hazard and Risk
Communication to Ensure Better
Responses to Evacuations
Open and transparent communications between
the stakeholders before and during a volcanic
eruption is a key point in improving crisis man-
agement capabilities. In order to enhance these
capabilities, it is essential to consider the local
and cultural factors in volcanic risk management.
As pointed out by Haynes et al. (2008), speciﬁc
differences between the public, authorities and
scientists are often responsible for misunder-
standings and misinterpretations of information,
resulting in differing perceptions of acceptable
risk. Deeper understanding of the at‐risk com-
munities is therefore a key issue in order to reduce
vulnerability in PDC hazard regions. Information
dissemination and education of the people at risk
are also key factors in correcting the perception of
PDC threats, and therefore in improving crisis
communication. Modes of communication should
be reviewed regularly in the context of social
changes. The need for community participation
and involvement in raising PDC hazard aware-
ness is crucial. Risk communication is a dialogue
between the communities and people giving the
warnings. The take-up of scientiﬁc advice is
much more efﬁcient when communication of that
advice is founded on personal trust rather than
written on a report (Haynes et al. 2007a). As a
result, communication of PDC hazard directly
between scientists and the public is very impor-
tant, e.g. on Montserrat (Haynes 2005; Donovan
and Oppenheimer 2014).
6 Conclusion: Improving Crisis
Management Capabilities
for PDC’s Risk Reduction
Crisis management capabilities may be improved
through a set of good practices that are theoret-
ically well-established, but that remain difﬁcult to
develop practically by the local stakeholders.
Among the good practices for raising PDC
hazard knowledge and public awareness, infor-
mation related to this speciﬁc hazard should be
widely disseminated, through the members of
hazard mitigation ofﬁces from regional to local
levels, not only within the PDC hazard zones but
also involve villages and cities located tens of
kilometres away from the vent. PDC hazard
information should be disseminated especially
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around dormant volcanoes, where volcanic risk
perception is usually low.
Video footage is an effective tool for raising
PDC hazard knowledge. During the 1991 eruption
of Mount Pinatubo (Philippines), the dissemina-
tion of a ﬁlm from the French volcanologists M.
and K. Kraft likely saved many thousands of lives.
Recently, the World Organization of Volcano
Observatories (WOVO) provides video resources
through VOLFilm, a Multilingual and multi-
platform ﬁlms database for resilience to risks
from volcanic hazards (http://www.wovo.org/
volﬁlm-multilingual-and-multi-platform-ﬁlms-for-
resilience-to-risks-from-volcanic-hazards.html).
Dissemination of information also comprises
continuous media slots on PDC risk prevention,
preparedness andmanagement taking into account
geographical speciﬁcities.
Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction
(CBDRR) should be considered in integrating
top-down and bottom-up approaches and as a
channel of information and actions between
stakeholders. Indeed it fosters the participation of
threatened communities in both the evaluation of
risk (including PDC hazards, vulnerability and
capacities) and in the ways to reduce it. Com-
munity participation and involvement in raising
PDC hazard awareness might be accomplished
through various ways: socioeconomic factors
should be better integrated from daily life to
strengthen livelihoods; collaboration should be
based on actual collaboration between institu-
tional and upper level stakeholders, local stake-
holders, and communities. Several approaches
may be taken in order to gain more traditional
knowledge of and responses to PDC-related
disasters, in the framework of a bottom-up dis-
aster risk reduction programme. Dialogue
between the communities and people giving the
warnings could be improved through participa-
tory methods, e.g. participatory volcanic hazard
mapping, community evacuation simulations,
rural appraisal, focused group discussion or
participatory three dimension mapping.
Efﬁcient communication between scientiﬁc
experts on PDC hazard, authorities, the media,
local NGOs, and the population should be
enhanced to improve crisis management. Infor-
mation should be provided to people on time and
using simple and clear language, preferably tra-
ditional language.
The need for community participation and
involvement in raising PDC hazard awareness is
crucial, especially among speciﬁc stakeholders,
e.g. recent immigrants or daily workers coming
from outside the PDC hazard zones or women,
who usually have a poorer knowledge of hazards
than their husband or children. Local and cultural
factors should also be considered in risk and
crisis management, especially because PDC
hazard is often related to local myths. The 2010
Merapi disaster suggests that religion is an
essential element of culture and must be carefully
considered in the planning process, and not
simply dismissed as a symptom of ignorance or
superstition. Participatory risk management
involving community leaders and their popula-
tions is most appropriate to bridge tradition, local
realities and the implementation of risk man-
agement policies and strategies.
To conclude, CBDRM eventually empowers
communities with self-developed and culturally
acceptable ways of coping with crises due to
PDC hazard.
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